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We examine the effects of a government’s sensitivity to its tax revenues, earned from 
the software industry, on its anti-piracy policies that consists of monitoring and 
penalizing a commercial software pirate. We consider a strategic entry-deterrence 
framework where the original producer chooses a pricing strategy that either allows or 
deters the pirate’s entry. Sensitivity to tax revenues is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to prevent piracy. Welfare maximization may or may not result in 
monitoring as the socially optimal outcome. If monitoring is socially optimal then the 
pirate’s entry is deterred. The equilibrium entry-deterring price may be less than the 
equilibrium monopoly price. Only in the extreme case the monopoly outcome is 
restored.  
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Software piracy has emerged as a leading issue and a growing concern for software 
developers and governments due to its high social and economic costs. The Seventh 
Annual BSA (Business Software Alliance) Global Software Piracy Study published in 
June 2002 reports that the world software piracy rate has increased from 37 percent in 
2000 to 40 percent in 2001. The consequence of software piracy is not only losses in 
retail software revenue, but also job, wage, and tax revenue losses. Tax revenue losses 
imply loss in meaningful public programs. For example the estimated total tax loss in 
U.S. for the year 2000 due to software piracy is $1,593,204,483.
1 Software piracy 
deprives the EU Member States of more than 9 billion euro in tax revenues.
2 
In this paper we focus on commercial piracy and consider a situation in which 
the government is responsible for exercising anti-piracy policies which consists of 
monitoring and penalizing the pirate within a strategic entry-deterrence framework. 
We analyze the impact of government’s sensitivity to tax revenue from the software 
industry on its anti-piracy policy instruments, and consequently, its effectiveness in 
deterring commercial piracy.  
  Commercial piracy refers to piracy through the retail channel and BSA defines 
it in its “Recommendations for Resellers” as follows.
3 4 
“Unscrupulous businesses and organized crime rings engage in the illegal 
duplication and sale of copyrighted material with the intent of directly 
imitating the copyrighted product. Sometimes the product looks very much like 
the real product; in other cases, the quality is obviously suspect, with poor 
print quality, homemade labels and the like.” 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Software State Piracy Study by BSA, November 2001. 
2 See http://global.bsa.org/eupolicy/enforcement/. 
3 See http://www.bsa.org/usa/antipiracy/tools/resellers.phtml. 
4 See http://www.bsa.org/usa/antipiracy/types/ for a detailed discussion on the types of piracy.   The need to address piracy from the commercial front and hence, this paper’s 
focus on commercial software piracy can be justified on the basis of the following two 
reasons. First it is difficult to implement enforcement policies towards end-user 
piracy. Second, focusing on commercial piracy and attempting to prevent it may not 
eliminate overall piracy but may reduce it, the impact of which is discussed later in 
this section. 
  The general focus of the literature on piracy has been on one by end-users and 
the effects of network externalities.
5 Harbough and Khemka (2000) address the issue 
of enforcement targeted towards only high-value end-users versus extensive 
enforcement. They discuss some of the difficulties in implementing extensive 
enforcement though it is superior to the targeted one. The main difficulty lies in 
raising the cost of piracy to consumers by disrupting easy access to pirated copies. 
This arises due to the advent of peer-to-peer technologies for sharing software and 
other files without a central server that makes the restriction to access pirated software 
prohibitively costly.  
  The high cost of monitoring households makes it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to prevent end-user piracy. Alternatively, it may be the case that due to 
lack of proper technical knowledge in making counterfeits of original software, many 
households depend on the availability of pirated soft ware in the retail market. 
  Therefore, we need to address the issue of commercial software piracy 
separately from end-user piracy. Even if piracy cannot be eliminated fully, 
government’s anti-piracy efforts directed towards sellers of pirated software rather 
than end-users may restrict overall piracy. 
                                                 
5 Chen et al (1999) show that pricing rather than monitoring is a better strategy to deal with end-user 
piracy. Cheng et al (1997) and Noyelle (1990) shows that high software prices are the dominant reason 
for piracy. Oz and Thisse (1999) shows that no protection against is an equilibrium in the presence of 
network externalities. Takeyama (1994), Conner and Rumelt (1991), and Nascimento and Vanhonacker 
(1988) also discusses the issue of copyright protection in the presence of network externalities.   IDC Economic Impact Study reports the effect of a 10 percent reduction in 
piracy rate across different regions of the world over a four year period from 2002 to 
2006.
6 The IDC study shows that such a reduction in the piracy rate will add: 1.1 
million new jobs, and more than $15 billion in tax revenues in the Asia-Pacific 
region; 145000 new jobs and more than $24 billion in tax revenues in North America; 
50000 new jobs and more than $800 million in tax revenues in Eastern Europe; 
200000 new jobs and more than $22.5 billion in tax revenues in Western Europe. 
  In our model there is a producer of legitimate software (hereafter, referred to 
as the monopolist) and a pirate who illegally reproduces and sells copies of legitimate 
software which is an inferior substitute of the legitimate software. This follows the 
definition of commercial piracy according to BSA. There is also a government who is 
responsible for monitoring and penalizing the pirate. The government also taxes the 
monopolist’s profit at an exogenously given proportional tax rate. We consider an 
entry-deterrence framework, in which the monopolist after observing the 
government’s anti-piracy policy chooses a pricing strategy that either allows 
(accommodating strategy) or deters (aggressive strategy) the pirate’s entry. The pirate 
then chooses a price if it decides to enter. The consumers can either buy the original, 
the pirated product, or nothing. 
  The government chooses its anti-piracy instruments that maximize social 
welfare. Social welfare consists of the monopolist’s after-tax profit, the pirate’s profit, 
consumer surplus, and the government’s tax revenue from the monopolist and its net 
expected revenue from antipiracy policies. The government attaches a weight to the 
tax revenue in its social welfare function. The value of the weight, which we call the 
“sensitivity factor”, indicates the government’s sensitivity to its tax revenues and 
                                                 
6 See http://global.bsa.org/idcstudy/. hence, towards its public works program. Indirectly, this weight can also be 
interpreted as government’s sensitivity towards copyright protection. The optimal 
policy variables endogenously determine the monopolist’s subgame perfect 
equilibrium pricing strategy.  
  Social welfare maximization may or may not result in monitoring as the 
socially optimal policy depending on the strength of the sensitivity factor. If it is 
socially optimal to monitor, then piracy is always deterred and the aggressive strategy 
is the subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium price may be less than the 
equilibrium monopoly price. The threat of the pirate’s entry generates competition 
that causes the equilibrium price to be less than the monopoly price. Only in the 
extreme case, piracy is deterred and the monopoly outcome is restored.
7 We show that 
the sensitivity factor is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to deter piracy. If not 
monitoring is the socially optimal policy then the market is shared between the 
monopolist and the pirate. 
  The paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we present the model. Section 3 
contains the equilibrium analysis of the accommodating and the aggressive subgames. 
In section 4 we discuss the welfare analysis and in section 5 we provide the 
concluding remarks. 
2. THE MODEL  
We consider four types of agents: the consumers, the monopolist, a pirate who 
illegally reproduces and sells licensed software, and the government which is 
responsible for monitoring and penalizing the pirate. We begin our analysis by 
describing the monopoly situation in the absence of piracy.  
                                                 
7 Banerjee (2003) shows that monitoring may or may not be the socially optimal policy in addressing 
the issue of commercial piracy. However, he shows that, if monitoring is the socially optimal policy, 
then the monopoly outcome is always restored. In the present paper, the strategic entry-deterrence 
framework generates more general results and the monopoly outcome is only a special case.   There is a continuum of consumers indexed by  [] h l θ θ θ θ ,   , ∈ . θ  is assumed to 
follow a uniform distribution. We assume there is no resale market for used software. 
Each consumer is assumed to purchase only one unit of the software. Following 
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θ          (1) 
θ  is the valuation of the consumer and  m p  is the price of one unit of the software 
charged by the monopolist. Thus, in the model, consumers differ from one another on 
the basis of their valuation of the software.  
  m θ  is the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying and not 
buying:  
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We treat the cost incurred by the monopolist to develop the software as a sunk 
cost. The cost of replicating the software after it has been developed is assumed to be 
zero. Hence, the monopolist’s profit is the total revenue;  m m m D p = π . The consumer 
surplus is  ∫ − =
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  Now, suppose that a commercial pirate exists in the market. The government 
only works through the supply side in controlling piracy. Users do not face the risk of 
prosecution from the use of pirated software. The government is responsible for monitoring and penalizing the pirate. Let G    and    α  be the monitoring rate and the 
penalty. The pirate pays the penalty G if his illegal operation is detected. Let  ) (α c  be 
the cost of monitoring. We assume  0. ) ( c   , 0 ) 0 (   , 0 ) (   , 0 ) 0 ( > ′′ = ′ > ′ = α α c c c   
The government chooses  G    and    α  to maximize domestic social-welfare 
subject to a balanced budget constraint. We assume this to avoid issues of 
redistribution that are associated with maximization of net revenue. Let R  be the net 
expected revenue of the government from its anti-piracy policy. 
). (α α c G R − =                           (5) 
The balanced budget constraint means  0 = R . This implies that the penalty equals the 
average cost of monitoring: 





G .                          (6) 
In the absence of monitoring, the penalty is irrelevant. So we assume  0 = G  if 
0 = α . G  is an increasing function of α . By assumption, the marginal cost of 
monitoring increases with monitoring. So the average cost of monitoring also 
increases with monitoring. The government also taxes the monopolist’s profit 
proportionately at a given rate ‘t’. 
The pirated software is an inferior substitute of the original software. Let q be 
the quality of the pirated software, ) 1   , 0 (   ∈ q , and q is given exogenously.
8 The 
quality of the original software is normalized to 1. The qualitative difference between 
the original and the pirated software arises because the support benefits and the full 
warranty that are included with the purchase of the original software does not come 
with the purchase of the pirated software. We also assume that the pirate’s marginal 
cost of duplicating is zero. 
                                                 
8 We set this bound to ensure that the profits are not indeterminate.   The game played between the government, the monopolist, the pirate, and the 
consumers is specified in extensive form as follows.  
Stage 1:  The government chooses a penalty G and a monitoring rate α . 
Stage 2:  The monopolist chooses a price  m p .  
Stage 3:   The pirate observes the monopolist’s strategy, and decides to enter or 
not. If it enters then it chooses a price  c p .  
Stage 4:   The consumers decide either to buy the original software or the pirated 
one or nothing. 
We now analyze the behavior of the different agents in our model. The 
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θ              (7a) 
c p  and  θ q  is the price and effective valuation of the pirated copy. If the pirate does 
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θ                   (7b) 
If the pirate exists in the market then there are two marginal consumers, 
.   and   2 1 θ θ
a  The marginal buyer 
a
1 θ  is indifferent between buying the original and the 
pirated software:  
⇒ − = − c
a
m
a p q p 1 1 θ θ
) 1 (
1 q
p p c m a
−
−
= θ .        ( 8 )  
The marginal buyer  2 θ  is indifferent between buying from the pirate and not buying 
at all:  
⇒ = − 0 2 c p qθ
q
pc = 2 θ .          ( 9 )    If the pirate does not enter the market then there is only one marginal 
consumer, 
b
1 θ , who is indifferent between buying the original software or not. So,  
m
b p = 1 θ                              (10) 
  We derive the demand faced by the monopolist and the pirate from (8), (9), 
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We assume that a firm remains in the market only if it is making nonzero 
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The monopolist chooses a pricing strategy that either allows or deters the 
                                                 
9 If the pirate enters and his operations are not detected, which occurs with probability ) 1 ( α − , then the 
consumer surplus is the sum of the consumer surpluses of the buyers of the original and the pirated 
software. Alternatively, if the pirate enters and his operations are detected, which occurs with 
probabilityα , only the original software is available. In this case the consumer surplus consists of the 
surplus of the buyers of the original product. This justifies the formulation of the consumer surplus in 
(12). pirate’s entry. The pricing strategy that allows the pirate’s entry is called the 
accommodating strategy (which is denoted by the superscript ac). The entry-deterring 
pricing strategy is called the aggressive strategy (which is denoted by the superscript 









































Government chooses a 
penalty G  and a monitoring 
Monopolist chooses a price 
m p . 
Pirate’s move. The government chooses a monitoring rate and a penalty that maximizes 
social welfare subject to the balanced budget constraint. The social welfare (SW) 
function without any weight attached to the tax revenue is, 
. ) 1 ( CS t CS t SW c m m c m + + = + + + − = π π π π π  The term  m tπ  is the government’s 
revenue, which it earns from taxing the monopolist’s profit. The net revenue from 
monitoring the pirate does not appear in the social welfare function because of the 
balanced budget constraint. 
We solve the equilibrium of the game depicted in Figure 1 by using the 






p =                              (14) 
3. EQUILIBRIUM ACCOMMODATING AND AGGRESSIVE STRATEGIES 
In this section we discuss the equilibrium accommodating and aggressive strategies. 
3.1 THE ACCOMMODATING SUBGAME 
In the ac-subgame the monopolist’s pricing strategy allows the pirate’s entry. If the 
government uncovers the pirate’s illegal operations, which occurs with probability α , 
he pays a penalty G to the government. Substituting the pirate’s reaction function, 
(14) into the monopolist’s profit function, 
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= , and 
equating its first derivative with respect to  m p  to zero gives us the equilibrium ac-
strategy. The results are summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1 
(i)  The monopolist’s equilibrium ac-strategy and the pirate’s equilibrium 
price is 
) 2 (
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θ  characterizes the size of the monopolist’s 
and pirate’s markets in equilibrium.  
(iii)  The profits of the monopolist and the pirate are: 
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Proposition 1 shows that in the presence of piracy the monopolist retains its 
original monopoly market by lowering the price of its product. This occurs because of 
the competition generated by the pirate’s entry. So the pirate only captures the lower-
end of the market without disturbing the monopolist’s market. Proposition 1 also 
shows that the pirate’s equilibrium profit is a decreasing function of the monitoring 
rate, α . However, the monopolist’s equilibrium profit is unaffected by the monitoring 
rate because it is independent of it. 
The consumer surplus and the social welfare, without any weight attached to 
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Rearranging (16a) we get the social welfare function as, 
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ac SW  is a decreasing function of α .   The proof of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that the pirate’s profit and the 
consumer surplus, in equilibrium, are decreasing functions of the monitoring rate. 
Also, the monopolist’s profit is independent of the monitoring rate and the monitoring 
cost increases with an increase in the monitoring rate. 
3.2.  THE AGGRESSIVE SUBGAME 
In this section we discuss the monopolist’s equilibrium entry-deterring aggressive-
strategy. By substituting the pirate’s reaction function (14) in its profit function, we 
get,  
) (
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The pirate’s entry is deterred if  0 ) (
















m c . By 
rearranging the terms we get the entry-deterrence condition as, 
) 1 (
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The monopolist chooses a price and a monitoring rate that maximizes its profit 
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  Suppose the entry deterrence condition holds with strict inequality, that is, 
) 1 (










m . In this case the monopolist can increase its price for any 
given monitoring rate such that the inequality still holds. This increases the 
                                                 






= . We continue this till the entry-deterrence condition holds with 
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m  is the solution to (20) and the monopolist’s 






m p p − = . Let  ) (
* α
ag
m p  be the solution to this aggressive 
entry-deterrence strategy. The results are summarized in Proposition 3 the proof of 
which requires Lemma 1. We include the proof of Proposition 3, which also contains 
the comparative static analysis of the monopolist’s profit with respect to the 






 is increasing in α . 
The proof of Lemma 1 follows from the fact that  ) (α c  is increasing in α  and  ) 1 ( α −   
is decreasing in α . 
Proposition 3 
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max α  satisfies 

































m  is an increasing function of the monitoring 
rate. As the monitoring rate reaches the critical value 
ag
max α  the price becomes the 
same as the equilibrium monopoly price, 
2
h θ
. For further increases in the monitoring 
rate there is no reason to choose a price more than 
2
h θ
, since that lowers profit and 
has no effect on entry. So up to 
ag
max α  the monopolist’s profit is an increasing function 
of the monitoring rate and beyond 
ag
max α  it is the same as in the monopoly case.  
  Figure 2 provides a diagrammatic representation of the comparative static 
analysis of the monopolist’s profit for the equilibrium ac- and ag-strategies with 
respect to α . We draw Figure 2 using Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2 
Let α  be the monitoring rate such that  ) ( ) (
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Figure 2 
Proposition 4 
] , 0 [ max
ag α α ∈  is the Pareto-efficient range of monitoring rate. 
  Proposition 4 can be explained using Figure 2. Raising the monitoring rate α  
beyond 
ag
max α  does not change profit or consumer surplus, but it increases the cost of 
monitoring which is a deadweight loss. So for the rest of our analysis we will only 
consider the range  ] , 0 [ max
ag α α ∈ .  
The consumer surplus and the social welfare without any weight attached to 
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Proposition 5 summarizes the comparative static analysis of the social welfare 
function with respect to α . Proposition 5 
) (
* α
ag SW  is monotonically decreasing in α . 
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ag









m  at 
ag
max α α = , and  0 ) ( > ′ α c . Intuitively, an increase 
in α  raises the monopolist’s profit up to 
ag
max α  where it reaches a maximum. However, 
an increase in α  increases the equilibrium price that results in a reduction in the 
consumer surplus. Further, the cost of monitoring, which is a deadweight loss, 
increases with an increase in α . So the overall effect of an increase in α  is a fall in 
the social welfare. 
4.  SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS 
The government seeks the monitoring rate and penalty that maximizes social welfare. 
These optimal policy variables affect the monopolist’s profits in the equilibrium ac- 
and ag-strategies. We compare the profits to determine the monopolist’s optimal 
strategy.  
The monopolist chooses the ag-strategy if  ) ( ) (




m ≥ . For simplicity 
we assume that if the monopolist’s equilibrium profits under the two strategies are 
equal then it chooses the entry-deterrent ag-strategy.  
  Let us introduce the sensitivity factor and redefine the social welfare function. 
The sensitivity factor is a weight,  β γ + =1 , which the government attaches to its tax 
revenue which it earns by taxing the monopolist’s profit. This weight measures the 
government’s sensitivity to the tax revenue, which it earns from the software market. 
It also signifies the importance, which the government attaches to its public works program in terms of the positive externalities that it generates to the society. The 
social welfare function can be redefined as, 
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The subscript, ‘s’, stands for the social welfare function with the sensitivity factor.  
Rearranging the terms, the social welfare function for the ac- and ag-
subgames can be rewritten as,  
) ( ) ( ) (
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Let 
* ac
s α  and 
* ag
s α  be the social welfare-maximizing monitoring rates for the ac- and 
ag-strategies.  
Proposition 6 




s α . 
Proposition 6 follows from the fact that 













=  is independent of the 
monitoring rate. So the sensitivity factor has no effect on 
* ac
m π . Also  ) (
* α
ac SW  is a 
decreasing function of the monitoring rate, (Proposition 2).  
  Let us now consider the social welfare function for the equilibrium ag-
strategy. The derivative of  ) (
* α
ag
s SW  with respect to α  is, 
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s SW . Proposition 7 summarizes the social welfare maximizing monitoring 
rates for the equilibrium ag-strategy, denoted as 
* ag
s α . The proof of Proposition 7 is 
provided in the Appendix. 
Proposition 7 
(i)  For  β β ≤ < 0 ,  0
* =
ag
s α . 
(ii)  For  β β ≥ , 
ag ag
s max
* α α = . 
(iii)  For β β β ≥ ≥ ,  ] , 0 [ max
* ag ag
s α α ∈ . In this range 
* ag
s α  and β  are positively 
related. 
Proposition 7 shows that depending on the degree of sensitivity which is indicated 
by the value of β , either  α α < ≤
* 0
ag





ag . This because the value of 
β  determines the shape of  ) (
* α
ag
s SW . 
Proposition 8 summarizes the social welfare-maximizing policies and the 
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. The proof is provided in the Appendix. Let 
*
s α  denote the socially optimal monitoring rate and 
*
s G  be the corresponding penalty 
satisfying the balanced budget constraint. 
Proposition 8 
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m p α , is the 
subgame perfect equilibrium. If 
ag ag
s max
* α α = , and the above conditions 
hold then the monopoly outcome is restored. (ii)   For all other cases,  0
* = s α . Consequently, the ac-strategy, 
) 2 (









, is the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
  Proposition 8 shows that government’s sensitivity to its revenue earned from 
the software market may or may not result in monitoring as the optimal policy. If it is 
optimal to monitor then piracy is deterred which means that government’s sensitivity 
to its tax revenue is effective in preventing commercial software piracy. In the 
extreme case sensitivity to tax revenue is effective in deterring piracy and restoring 
the monopoly outcome.  
  Propositions 7 and 8 show that  β β >  is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for entry-deterrence. It means that higher the sensitivity factor the greater is 
the possibility for entry-deterrence. This is because an increase in the sensitivity 
factor has a greater effect on 
* ag
s SW  than on 
* ac
s SW .   
  Let us consider the effect of an increase in β  on 
* ac
s SW . From Proposition 6 
we know that irrespective of the value of β , 
* ac
s SW  is always a decreasing function 
of the monitoring rate. Hence,  0
* =
ac
s α . This because 
* ac
m π  is independent of the 
monitoring rate. Therefore, the tax revenue earned by taxing the monopolist’s profit is 
also independent of the monitoring rate. So an increase in β  has only direct effect in 
the sense that it only increases 
* ac
s SW  without having any impact on monopolist’s 
profit and the tax revenue. It behaves like a shift factor by raising the social welfare 
but it is always the case that 0
* =
ac
s α . 
  An increase in β  have direct and indirect effects on 
* ag
s SW . The direct effect 
is that β  behaves like a shift factor in the sense that an increase in β  increases * ag
s SW . However, an increase in β  has an indirect effect on 
* ag
s SW . From 
Proposition 7 we know that in the range,β β β ≥ ≥ ,  ] , 0 [ max
* ag ag
s α α ∈  and 
* ag
s α  and β  
are positively related. So an increase in β  raises the monitoring rate. We know that 
for  ] , 0 [ max
* ag ag
s α α ∈  the monopolist’s profit for the equilibrium ag-strategy is 
increasing in the monitoring rate. This means that in this range the government’s tax 
revenue is also increasing in the monitoring rate. So an increase in the sensitivity 
factor raises the monopolist’s profit and the tax revenue via the monitoring rate. For 
the range  β β ≥  an increase in β  does not have any impact on the monopolist’s 
profit and the tax revenue because in this range 
ag ag
s max
* α α = . So in this case there is 
only direct effect but no indirect effect on 
* ag
s SW . 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we analyzed the effectiveness of government’s sensitivity to tax revenue 
from the software industry in deterring commercial piracy through its anti-piracy 
policy, which consists of monitoring and penalizing the illegal operations of a 
commercial software pirate. We considered a strategic-entry deterrence framework 
where the monopolist chose a pricing strategy that either allowed (accommodating) or 
deterred (aggressive) the pirate’s entry. The government’s social welfare maximizing 
policy determined the subgame perfect pricing strategy and the pirate’s entry.  
  We showed that government’s sensitivity towards its tax revenue from the 
software industry is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to deter commercial 
software piracy. If the sensitivity is above a certain critical level then monitoring may 
be the socially optimal outcome in which case the monopolist’s aggressive pricing 
strategy is the subgame perfect equilibrium and piracy is prevented. The greater the 
sensitivity factor the higher is the socially optimal monitoring rate and consequently the higher is the equilibrium entry-deterring price. In the extreme case the equilibrium 
monopoly price is restored. 
  Given the difficulty in implementing anti-piracy policies directed towards end-
user piracy, addressing the commercial piracy issue may reduce the overall piracy 
rate. This paper showed that government’s sensitivity towards its tax revenue from the 
software industry may be one necessary factor that may result in the prevention of 
commercial software piracy.  
  Reduction in the overall piracy rate will not only increase sales revenue, jobs, 
wages, and tax revenues but will also result in an increased growth. According to the 
IDC Economic Impact study, a 10 percent reduction in the piracy rate during the 
2002- 2006 period will add: $170 billion in additional economic growth in the Asia-
Pacific region, $11.2 billion in additional economic growth in Eastern Europe, $150 
billion in additional economic growth in North America, and $91 billion in additional 
economic growth in Western Europe. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 3 
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= . There is no reason to choose a price more than 
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h θ
, since that lowers 
profit and has no effect on entry.            Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7 
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Proof of Proposition 8 
(a) Let us first consider the combination,  0
* =
ac
s α  and  α α < ≤
* 0
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m π π >  as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, in this case,  0
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there are two possibilities. 
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the weakly dominant one as shown in figure 2. 
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will be  0
* = s α  and 
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m p  is the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.          Q.E.D 
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